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FOREWORD
Stories about unmanned vehicles now appear reg
ularly in the national news—and not always in good
ways. Within the last 2 years, privately-owned drones
have crashed on the White House lawn, surveilled the
U.S. Embassy in Paris, and buzzed German Chancel
lor Angela Merkel. When used in military operations,
autonomous weapon systems (AWS) have the poten
tial to save lives as well as apply lethal force across
land, sea, and air.
In this Letort Paper, Mr. Jeffrey Caton posits that
the development of AWS policy and doctrine should
characterize autonomy not as a discrete property of
a given system, but rather as a function that varies in
its strategic, operational, and tactical context and mis
sion application. Further, he argues that AWS design,
planning, and operations should be tempered with
the purposeful consideration of human judgment
and control as well as legal and ethical standards that
foster international credibility.
Through its current military operations, the United
States is setting both overt and tacit precedents for the
world with regard to the appropriate use of AWS. This
Paper provides readers with background information
crucial to the full understanding of the complex chal
lenges facing the future development and operation of
AWS across the full range of military operations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in
warfare is not a new concept. One could argue that the
development and integration of such systems have
evolved over the last century and accelerated signifi
cantly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on
the U.S. homeland. AWS will likely continue to grow
in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of un
manned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or
even the United States; it is an international phenom
ena that includes government and commercial appli
cations in all domains—air, land, and sea. Commercial
endeavors for unmanned systems are at the forefront
of many technologies and their proliferation will
likely outnumber military use in the future.
What does the Department of Defense hope to gain
from the use of AWS? This Letort Paper explores a di
verse set of complex issues related to the developmen
tal, operational, legal, and ethical aspects of AWS. It
will briefly explore the recent history of the develop
ment and integration of autonomous and semi-auton
omous systems into traditional military operations. It
will examine anticipated expansion of these roles in
the near future as well as outline international efforts
to provide a context for U.S. use of the systems. These
topics are well-documented in many sources, thus this
Paper serves as a primer for current and future AWS
operations to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective staffs an
overall appreciation for existing capabilities and the
challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with
AWS across the range of military operations. Empha
sis is added to missions and systems that include the
use of deadly force.
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Discussion is limited to unclassified and open
source information; any classified discussion must oc
cur at another venue. Despite the goal of using precise
language, the following terms may be used somewhat
interchangeably due largely to the variety of source
material cited in this Paper: autonomous weapon sys
tem; robot; drone; unmanned system; unmanned ve
hicle; unmanned platform.
After providing background information on the
meaning of autonomy and its contemporary applica
tions, the Paper establishes a dialogue in four main
sections:
1. Developmental Issues Related to Autonomous
Systems. This section explores two questions: How
should the United States develop autonomy-related
applications for use across the range of military op
erations? What technologies are imperative to the de
velopment of AWS? It addresses these questions first
by describing the current state-of-the-art for Army
unmanned ground vehicle systems, then by examin
ing technology issues across the scope of application
of autonomy, and ends with a brief analysis of the fed
eral budget trends for AWS development.
2. Operational Issues Related to Use of Autono
mous Systems. This section addresses two questions
related to a vision of fully integrated AWS operations:
What can be achieved via autonomy within the range
of military operations? What missions can be en
hanced by incorporating AWS? The resulting discus
sion considers the role of mission parameters, efforts
toward AWS integration into force structure, doctri
nal requirements, international efforts, and strategic
geopolitical challenges.
3. Legal Issues Related to Use of Autonomous
Systems. This section examines the legally acceptable

xii

uses of autonomous weapon systems within the range
of military operations. It first looks at existing interna
tional legal conventions including the Law of Armed
Conflict, then reviews recent assessments by the Unit
ed Nations, next it focuses on the concept of human
control and judgement as it applies to AWS. Finally, it
reviews current vignettes as well as consider potential
trends for the future.
4. Ethical Issues Related to Use of Autonomous
Systems. What should be the ethically acceptable and
advisable uses of AWS within the range of military
operations? What moral principles should form the
foundation of AWS development and operation? This
section explores these questions by first reviewing the
ongoing work for developing ethical frameworks for
AWS, then considering the varying cultural views that
AWS applications may evoke, as well as analyze the
potential reduction or proliferation in warfare that
widespread use of AWS may introduce. Finally, it
looks toward the future and contemplates potential
long-term effects on national security.
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AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:
A BRIEF SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTAL,
OPERATIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES
The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in
warfare is not a new concept. One could argue that the
development and integration of such systems have
evolved over the last century and accelerated signifi
cantly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on
the U.S. homeland. AWS will likely continue to grow
in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of un
manned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or
even the United States; it is an international phenom
ena that includes government and commercial appli
cations in all domains—air, land, and sea. Commercial
endeavors for unmanned systems are at the forefront
of many technologies and their proliferation will
likely outnumber military use in the future.
BACKGROUND
Before examining issues related to autonomous
weapon systems, it is important to establish a broad
context and lexicon for the subject. This section ex
plores the meaning of autonomy and establishes the
definition for use in this Paper. It also provides a
context for discussion through a brief look at the his
tory of autonomous systems as well as contemporary
applications.
What is Autonomy?
The intellectual dialogue among philosophers re
garding autonomy in human interactions goes back
over 300 years.1 There is no universally accepted defini
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tion for autonomy for applications involving humanmachine systems. This should not be a surprise, given
the complex nature and implications of anonymous
systems, and such a lack of basic terminology is not
unique (e.g., consider the vastly different meanings of
the term “cyberspace” in contemporary culture). There
appears to be a general consensus within the ongoing
discourse on the topic that autonomy is best character
ized not as a discrete property of an object or system,
but rather as a relationship between a system and its
operator that may vary across the spectrum of differ
ent degrees of system autonomy. In simple terms, this
spectrum progresses from controlled operations (“hu
man in the loop”), to supervised operations (“human
on the loop”), to fully autonomous operations (“hu
man out of the loop”).2 Thus, the use of machine au
tonomy is a common experience in daily life when one
considers such systems as automobile cruise control,
aircraft autopilot, or digital video recorders.
When one considers the use of autonomy in
weapon systems, the need for more precise language
is required, especially for systems that may involve
the potential application of lethal force. Toward this
end, the United States is one of the few countries in
the world to have an openly published government
policy in this area.3 Department of Defense (DoD) Di
rective 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, not only
establishes policy and organizational responsibilities,
but it also “establishes guidelines designed to mini
mize the probability and consequences of failures in
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems
that could lead to unintended engagements.”4 In ad
dition to “autonomous” and “semi-autonomous,” the
directive also defines “human-supervised” as a cat
egory of autonomous weapon systems. Figure 1 pro
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vides the definitions of these categories of autonomy
with their correlated common names. The definitions
are arranged in increasing level of autonomy with
an intentional overlap between the graphic borders
around each definition. These intersecting areas pro
vide conceptual clarity since a given system may have
subsystems operating in different modes of autonomy
during different parts of a mission. For simplicity, this
Paper will use the term “autonomous weapon sys
tem” or AWS to describe any DoD system that fits the
definitions shown in this Figure.

Figure 1: Spectrum of Autonomy in Weapon
Systems.5
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It is important to note that DoD clearly distinguish
es a difference between autonomy and remote control.
Thus, when considering unmanned aircraft, their rule
is “when the aircraft is under remote control, it is not
autonomous. And when it is autonomous, it is not
under remote control.”6 This distinction implies that
any remote control of an unmanned aircraft7 negates
any consideration of autonomy. However, in a com
plex system-of-systems design, the operator may be
remotely controlling a sensor while the aircraft is on
autopilot—essentially, the aircraft is flying itself and
should be considered autonomous. The implications
for a more nuanced model of autonomy are discussed
later in this Paper.
While DoD Directive 3000.09 applies to AWS
that involve “the application of lethal or non-le
thal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force by autonomous or
semi-autonomous weapon systems,” it specifically
excludes:
cyberspace systems for cyberspace operations; un
armed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions;
munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., la
ser- or wire-guided munitions); mines; or unexploded
explosive ordnance.8

This distinction of applicability may introduce a dis
connect into DoD policy with respect to “unarmed,
unmanned platforms” since they may still inflict inju
ry or collateral damage to individuals and property if
they malfunction. For example, an automated convoy
vehicle that runs amok due to a system malfunction
may injure a person or cause damage that is similar in
effect to collateral damage from an errant AWS.
A vital theme in DoD Directive 3000.09 is the re
quirement for AWS to “be designed to allow com
4

manders and operators to exercise appropriate levels
of human judgment over the use of force.”9 Respon
sibility to meet this mandate is shared among many
facets of the development and procurement process,
to include rigorous hardware and software testing,
safety and information assurance precautions, op
erator procedures and training, and legal review. The
section of this Paper on operational uses will discuss
issues related to these obligations in more detail.
Historical Context.
The use of AWS in warfare is not a new concept.
One could argue that the development and integra
tion of such systems has evolved over the last century.
While a comprehensive exploration is beyond the
scope of this work, some famous examples include the
Kettering “Bug” Aerial Torpedo (circa 1917)10 as well
as Soviet “Teletank” units (two battalions), and Ger
man “Goliath” remote-control mini-tanks (over 7,500
produced) used during World War II.11 Evolutionary
system milestones that may be of significant interest
to modern AWS include the first launch of a Maverick
missile from an Air Force target drone in December
197112 and the introduction in 1972 of the British Mor
fax Wheelbarrow, the first unmanned ground vehicle
(UGV) used for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).13
Looking exclusively at UGVs, Douglas Gage of the
Naval Ocean Systems Center has written about tech
nical aspects of the early days of these ground-based
AWS.14 Gage’s account characterizes the efforts as
largely focused on research and development in the
1960s through the 1980s, with work led by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and
prestigious technical universities. Various programs
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experimented with various forms of locomotion, sens
ing, navigating, and decisionmaking as well as the
ability to manipulate tools to perform a specific mis
sion. In the 1980s, research programs emerged that
were more focused on potential military applications.
Among them were the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive
Command (TACOM) and DARPA work on the Ad
vanced Ground Vehicle Technology and the Naval
Ocean Systems Center work on Ground Surveillance
Robot (GSR) for the Marine Corps. The GSR was not a
small system; it used the 7-ton M-114 armored person
nel carrier as its foundation. Other efforts during this
time period used dune buggies and the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their
chassis.15 Development of robotic systems in the 1980s
also included some of the early armed UGVs such as
the Grumman Robotic Ranger (demonstrated remote
missile firing) and the RDS PROWLER (demonstrated
missile and machine gun firing) as well as several
prototypes of potentially autonomous security robots
with lethal weaponry.16
In 1990, a congressionally-mandated joint program
office was established to better coordinate UGV de
velopment efforts among the Army and the Marine
Corps, a relationship that is part of the overall Joint
Ground Robotics Enterprise (JGRE) construct.17 Into
this century, after the 9/11 attacks, the use of UGVs
saw a rapid expansion for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in
response to warfighter urgent needs for systems such
as PackBot, TALON, and MARCBot.18 The evolution
of these systems will be discussed in more detail in the
developmental issues section of this Paper.
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Contemporary Applications.
The current master plan to coordinate DoD un
manned system efforts is described in considerable
detail by the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap,
FY2013-2038, a document approved by two key leaders
within DoD acquisition—Admiral James Winnefeld,
Jr., the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
Frank Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
This comprehensive plan addresses strategic planning
and policy, technologies, operating environments, lo
gistics and sustainment, training, and international
cooperation for unmanned systems applications in
the domains of air, land, and sea.19 Table 1 provides
the description of domain-based unmanned systems
per the Integrated Roadmap. It is interesting to note
that, consistent with the emphasis on air systems,
only the term UAS is explicitly defined in current joint
doctrine.20
unmanned aircraft system
(UAS)
unmanned ground system
(UGV)

unmanned maritime system
(UMS)

A system whose components include the necessary equipment,
network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.
A powered physical system with (optionally) no human operator
aboard the principal platform, which can act remotely to ac
complish assigned tasks. UGS may be mobile or stationary, can
be smart learning and self-adaptive, and include all associated
supporting components such as operator control units (OCU).
UMS comprise unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), which
include both unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs), all necessary support components,
and the fully integrated sensors and payloads necessary to ac
complish the required missions.

Table 1. DoD Domain-Based Unmanned System
Descriptions.21
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Interest in unmanned systems is by no means limit
ed to the U.S. military. The U.S. Government Account
ability Office (GAO) has conducted numerous studies
that examine not only the use of such systems among
government departments and agencies, but also the
implications of exporting commercial versions of some
unmanned systems (or their related technologies).22 In
a July 2012 report, GAO examined the issue of world
wide proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
noting that in only 7 years, “the number of countries
that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sys
tem nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75.”23
Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the magni
tude of the worldwide situation, with shaded portions
of the map indicating countries that operate UAVs.

Figure 2. Countries with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(as of December 2010).24
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Contributing to this proliferation is the explosion
of the domestic UAS market. The Association for
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI),
an industry advocacy group, claims that the current
global commercial market (manufacturers and appli
cations) for unmanned systems is comprised of 2,400
platforms and 900 companies for air systems; 880 plat
forms and 340 companies for ground systems, and 810
platforms and 340 companies for maritime systems.25
The economic potential is huge for a UAV industry if
and when it is fully integrated into U.S. airspace. An
AUVSI report from March 2013 projects the potential
for 70,000 new jobs within the first 3 years of inte
gration with an economic impact of more than $13.6
billion, and this is further projected to grow to over
100,000 new jobs with $82 billion benefit by 2025.26 As
with many high-technology products, unmanned ve
hicles may have dual-use potential for both commer
cial and government purposes.
Now that we have a better appreciation for the di
verse and dynamic context of unmanned systems in
general, let us now examine some of the opportunities
and challenges associated with their military applica
tions. Consistent with DoD guidance, the use of AWS
in any part of the range of military operations must
include the opportunity for appropriate human judg
ment, but this responsibility also extends to those who
design and develop the systems.27 The next section ad
dresses some of the key issues facing the community
that takes a given AWS through the processes from
an initial requirement or concept up to being a fully
capable field asset.
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DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES RELATED
TO AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
What does DoD hope to gain from the use of AWS?
The Integrated Roadmap contends that:
unmanned systems will be critical to U.S. operations
in all domains across a range of conflicts, both be
cause of their capability and performance advantages
and because of their ability to take greater risk than
manned systems.28

Further, it cites three primary forces driving DoD ef
forts: (1) military utility of unmanned systems as dem
onstrated in combat operations in Southwest Asia;
(2) anticipated budget constraints that require more
affordable technical solutions; and (3) changing inter
national security environment, especially the strategic
shift to Asia-Pacific Theater and the resulting anti-ac
cess/area denial (A2/AD) challenges.29 Summing it all
up, the vision of the roadmap states simply, “DoD will
develop and field affordable, flexible, interoperable,
integrated, and technologically advanced unmanned
capabilities.”30
Toward this vision, this section explores two ques
tions: How should the United States develop auton
omy-related applications for use across the range of
military operations? What technologies are impera
tive to the development of AWS? The section ad
dresses these questions first by describing the current
state-of-the-art for Army UGV systems. It then exam
ines technology issues in decreasing scope of applica
tion—from those for unmanned systems in general, to
those related to the use of autonomy, to those specifi
cally related to UGV purposes. The section ends with
a brief analysis of the federal budget trends for AWS
development.
10

Current DoD and Army Developmental State
of the Art in Autonomous Systems.
In a 2012 report, the Defense Science Board (DSB)
examined the role of autonomy in DoD systems and
concluded that, despite the proven usefulness of un
manned systems in operation, “autonomy technology
is being underutilized as a result of material obstacles
within the Department” that include “poor design
[and] lack of coordination of research and develop
ment (R&D) efforts.”31 Further, the report argues that
recent development of unmanned systems was large
ly evolutionary, moving forward based on combat
experience and experimentation in Iraq and Afghani
stan. The report does argue that the concept of armed
UAVs, which combine the strike and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions into
a single platform, is a revolutionary new capability.
In both cases, the main impetus behind the systems
was an operational pull to support missions to defeat
improvised explosive devices and to eliminate highvalue targets.32
The push to acquire UGV system rapidly to sup
port OIF/OEF urgent needs led to widespread pur
chase of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.
Eventually, over 7,000 UGV of many different designs
were purchased, mostly using Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funding.33 Table 2 depicts the evo
lution in functional focus of ground robotics in com
bat from 162 systems in 2004 to over 7,000 by 2012.34
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Year

Number of Ground
Robot Systems

2004

162

Functional Focus
- No single vendor could produce 162
- Five vendors, multiple configurations
- Joint effort, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] focused

2005

1,800

- Robot’s proven ability to save lives
- Expansion beyond EOD mission (Countermine, Security)
- Agreements with AMC [Army Materiel Command] and REF
[Rapid Equipping Force]

2006

4,000

- Engineers and Infantry
- Route clearance, Explosive detection & Weaponization
development

2007

5,000

- Special Forces robot applications assessed
- Route clearance, Explosive detection & Weaponization on
battlefield

6,000

- Range extension
- CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explo
sives] detection
- Persistent surveillance
- RC [Remote Control] HMMWV
- More capable payloads
- Maneuver elements

7,000

- Military Police
- Smaller platforms
- Enhanced battery life
- Commonality
- More capable payloads

>7,000

- “Plug & play” capabilities
- Limited autonomy
- Weaponization
- Increased agility and dexterity
- Interoperability

2008-09

2010-12

2013-14

Table 2. Evolution of Ground Robotics in Combat.35
In parallel to the ad hoc procurement of UGVs for
OIF/OEF, a methodical and coordinated effort to in
corporate unmanned systems was ongoing as part of
the Future Combat System (FCS). Initially envisioned
by General Eric Shinseki in 1999, FCS was the huge pro
gram ($200 billion) that integrated 18 systems around
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a central network. Of the original 18 systems, 10 were
to be unmanned: four different classes of UAV; three
different types of UGVs; and three other unmanned
ground systems that included a vertical missile launch
system. Although the program achieved its Milestone
B of the DoD acquisition framework in 2003, FCS was
reduced in scope and eventually cancelled in June
2009. Little of the decade-long development effort was
salvaged.36
As OIF/OEF closed out, the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff, Operations and Plans (G-3/5/7) directed a
bridging strategy to sustain select existing COTS sys
tems (primarily Talon and Packbot families) for up to
8 years until UGVs are available via traditional acqui
sition program of record methodology.37 This includes
resetting and sustaining almost 1,500 COTS robots
while working to incorporate interoperability, chassis
commonality, and payload modularity into systems
being developed.38 The anticipated strategic environ
ment for this unmanned system development is large
ly derived from capstone DoD studies such as the
Quadrennial Defense Review as well as priorities from
the President and Congress. Per the Integrated Roadmap, the explicit strategic trends and environmental
characteristics are:
• Reduction in federal budgets;
• Operational issues will be more complex;
• U.S. military forces will be rebalanced toward
the Pacific;
• Violent extremism will continue to threaten
U.S. interests;
• Unmanned technologies will continue to im
prove; and,
• Cyber domain will be a conflict environment.39
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The Integrated Roadmap also addresses potential im
plication of adversary use of unmanned systems,
especially in support of A2/AD missions:
Enemy unmanned systems will complicate air, ground,
and maritime operations by adding new low-altitude,
ground, and amphibious threats to the force that must
be countered. This concern will require the develop
ment of friendly countermeasures, including tactics,
techniques, procedures, and training that enable the
force to operate in the emerging environment.40

Given these myriad challenges, what are the key tech
nologies necessary to support the development of
future unmanned systems?
Key Technologies for Unmanned Systems.
Determination of the technology foci for un
manned systems should be informed by the expected
capabilities that such systems will fulfill in the range
of military operations. The framework of Joint Capa
bility Areas (JCAs) is utilized by DoD to help organize
and manage this process. Currently, there are four
JCAs envisioned for unmanned systems to support:
battlespace awareness, force application, protection,
and logistics.41 While many of the basic requirements
of locomotion, sensing, navigation, and connectivity
were solved at the prototype level in the 1980s and
1990s, and further refined through combat experience
in the 21st century, there remain significant technolog
ical challenges for AWS development. The Integrated
Roadmap narrows this to nine technology areas that
are presented in Table 3 along with summaries of the
proposed objectives and activities for each area.
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Technology Areas

Objectives and Activities

Interoperability and
Modularity

- Develop and stabilize standard information exchange requirements (IERs) with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners
- Meet interoperability requirements such as those specified in DoDD 5000.01 and CJCSI
6212.01F
- Create interoperable components, subsystem, and payload interface to enhance modularity
and reduce life cycle cost

Communication
Systems, Spectrum,
and Resilience

- Pursue platform agnostic command, control, communications, and computers (C4) infra
structure
- Simplify plug-and-play payload interfaces to lower costs and enhance ability to update,
modify, upgrade, and link
- Utilize globally available C4 enterprise capabilities (such as data centers and distribution
nodes)

Security: Research
and Intelligence/
Technology
Protection (RITP)

- Use layered application of protective measures to prevent compromise of critical informa
tion and technology
- Assess system vulnerabilities and threats as early as reasonable in the development
process
- Provide unmanned systems with the ability to remotely and autonomously render data at
rest unrecoverable by an adversary
- Create classification guidelines that transcend organizational cultures and build trust
between Intelligence Community agencies and mission partners

Persistent Resilience

- Reduce the size, weight, and power consumption of unmanned systems
- Achieve reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) performance sufficient for longduration missions (such as single unmanned vehicle ISR for periods exceeding 24 hours)
- Utilize active warning and self-protection subsystems as well as passive measures to
enhance survivability
- Pursue advanced structures, material, and propulsion solutions

Autonomy and
Cognitive Behavior

- Move unmanned systems from executing preprogrammed plans to performing missions
with dynamic tasks
- Develop ability for unmanned systems to modify strategies and self-directed behavior
necessary to achieve a human-directed goal
- Incorporate key enablers such as dynamic mission planning, precise position, navigation,
and timing (PNT), and appropriate machine rules of engagement for utilizing processed
information and mitigating lost links

Weaponry

- Develop and standardize weapons specifically designed for use on unmanned systems
- Design weapons with multiple modes of operation that include the ability for scalable ef
fects (similar in concept to nuclear “dial-a-yield”)
- Utilize advanced weapons materials and nanoenergetics to increase performance and
reduce weight

Table 3. DoD Key Areas for the Technological
Advancement of Unmanned Systems.42
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Tackling these technologies in a concerted fashion
may yield dramatic improvements that facilitate mis
sion performance, endurance, reliability, and synchro
nization at reduced levels of human risk and logistics
burden. When considering development of lethal
AWS, the areas of weaponry and autonomy and cog
nitive behavior merit further insight. The evolution of
weaponized AWS has been largely an ad hoc process
that adapted unmanned platforms to use available
munition systems. This has been proven effective for
combinations such as Hellfire missiles on Predator
UAVs. But there is great potential for optimization
at the system-of-systems level if the weaponry is de
signed specifically for unique features of a given un
manned platform. In this way, the munition system
may be better suited to operate within the unmanned
systems’ environment (including optimized size and
shape), to exchange mission data, and to be inter
changeable within classes of unmanned systems.43
For autonomy and cognitive behavior, the aim can
be stated simply as “the future of autonomous sys
tems is characterized as a movement beyond autono
mous mission execution to autonomous mission perfor
mance.”44 In other words, unmanned systems should
strive to emulate appropriate cognitive behavior in
the battlespace, just as the brain of a military opera
tor must adapt to the inevitable changes that transpire
as they move from the planning cell to “boots on the
ground” as well as anticipate future change.45 Pursu
ing the concept of autonomy requires its own subset
of supporting technologies.
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Technologies that Facilitate Autonomy.
How does one break down the complex concept of
autonomy into practical elements that can be realized
through use of the proper technology? A framework
developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) ex
amines how varying levels of autonomy may be re
quired to enable mission accomplishment as part of an
iterative process that exercises an AWS ability to form
a world model, the ability to reason, and the ability to
alter actions. When actions are altered by the AWS,
the world model changes and the cycle repeats.46 In an
unrelated effort, in a 2012 task force report, the DSB
identified “six key areas in which advances in auton
omy would have significant benefit to the unmanned
system”47 that are summarized in Table 4. These six
areas correlate well to the ONR framework, with per
ception technology linked to determining a world
model; planning and learning technologies linked to
the ability to reason; and human-robot interaction,
natural language understanding, and multi-agent co
ordination linked to the ability to alter actions. The
DSB study also examined the state of the art of each
of these six areas and provided an assessment of gaps
that should be addressed to improve the application
of autonomy for DoD systems.
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Technology Areas

Application for Autonomy in Unmanned Systems

Perception

Perception is essential for autonomy, for enabling the unmanned vehicle to achieve reach (e.g.,
navigate through environments and manipulate obstacles) and for using reach to meet mission
objectives, either for a platform (e.g., collecting sensor data, applying kinetic weapons, defeat
ing IEDs) or for the battlespace.

Planning

Planning is the process of computing a sequence or partial order of actions that change the
world from the current state to a desired state, or in DoD terminology, a plan is a course of ac
tion designed to achieve mission objectives while minimizing resource utilization. The process
relies on two key components: 1) a representation of actions, descriptions of conditions in the
world and objectives/resource optimization criteria and 2) algorithms for computing action
sequences and assigning resources to the actions so as to conform to the hard constraints of
the problem (e.g., vehicle limitations in terms of terrain and speed) while optimizing the soft
constraints (e.g., minimizing the total mission time or personnel use).

Learning

Machine Learning has become one of the most effective approaches to developing intelligent,
autonomous systems. Automatically inducing knowledge from data has generally been found to
be more effective than manual knowledge engineering. Development of state-of-the-art systems
in computer vision, robotics, natural language processing and planning now rely extensively on
automated learning from training data. Mining large amounts of real-world data to find reliable
patterns, generally results in more accurate and robust autonomous systems than manual
software engineering. This also allows a system to automatically adapt to novel environments
from actual experience operating in these situations.

Human-Robot
Interaction

Human-robot interaction (HRI) is a relatively new, multi-disciplinary field that addresses how
people work or play with robots versus computers or tools. This is a subset of the larger field of
human-system interaction, as the focus is on bi-directional, cognitive interactions in which the
robot is a physically situated agent operating at a distance from the user, versus a computer or
autopilot, thus leading to significant distinctions. In order to be consistent with the scientific lit
erature, the term HRI will be used generally, but UxV [unmanned vehicle] will serve to describe
the specific form of robot.

Natural Language
Understanding

Natural language is the most normal and intuitive way for humans to instruct autonomous
systems; it allows them to provide diverse, high-level goals and strategies rather than detailed
teleoperation. However, understanding human language is difficult since it is inherently ambigu
ous, and context must be used to infer the intended meaning. Therefore, building autonomous
systems that can follow English instructions as well as human speech is a very difficult techni
cal challenge. Therefore, traditional graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are frequently a more
effective approach to communicating with computing systems. However, in many situations
(e.g., when the user’s hands are otherwise engaged), language is a very desirable mode of
communication.

Multi-agent
Coordination

Multi-agent coordination is a term that is broadly applied to accomplishing a task that is
distributed over multiple robots, software agents or humans. Each agent is considered to have
some degree of individual autonomy, and the coordination may either emerge from the agents
interacting or negotiating with each other directly (distributed coordination) or be explicitly
directed by a planner (centralized coordination). Regardless of the coordination scheme, the
distribution of an activity across multiple agents implies that coordination schemes must ad
dress synchronization of the agents with each other and to dynamically changing aspects of the
environment or mission.

Table 4. DSB Key Areas for Advancement
in Autonomy to Benefit Unmanned Systems.48
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In practical terms, any AWS that embraces the
technologies in Table 4 in its design must also meet
strict operational effectiveness and suitability test pa
rameters as certified by the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation.49 For Army-specific applications,
UGVs will need to support the traditional “shoot
move-communicate” technique of ground forces, but
they must do so in “environments [that] could include
being thrown or launched, climbing hills or stairs,
and hopping and landing upright.”50 Independent of
the DSB findings, the Army science and technology
(S&T) community identified the need for enhanced
capabilities in five areas: adaptive tactical reasoning;
focused situational awareness; safe, secure, and adap
tive movement; efficient proactive interaction with
humans; and interaction with the physical world.51
To pursue these capabilities, the Army Research
Laboratory formed the Robotics Collaborative Tech
nology Alliance (RCTA) as a consortium of nine gov
ernment, industrial, and academic institutions to ad
dress research and development relevant to future
military unmanned ground vehicles.52 The RCTA
Program Plan simplified the title of the five enhanced
capability areas to: think-look-move-talk-work. Table
5 summarizes the vision and challenges of each ca
pability area. The RCTA plan goes on to identify five
primary cross-cutting technical barriers which are
compared across the think-look-move-talk-work par
adigm to identify the fundamental research thrusts
that the consortium will pursue.53
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Enhanced
Capability Area

Vision and Challenges

Adaptive Tactical

- Vision: robots understand the concept of a mission or task, including stages of progress and

Reasoning

measures of success.
- Adaptive tactical reasoning requires both declarative and procedural knowledge with which to
reason. Neither exists in current systems, which generally have no data structures for mission

“Think”

level information. Tactical reasoning also requires some kind of model of the other members
of the team, both human and robot, so that reasonable predictions of expected behavior can
be made.

Focused Situational

- Vision: future autonomous ground systems maintain situational awareness (SA) that is

Awareness

relevant to the current task and the larger mission.
- Focused SA, requires a semantic/cognitive description of the robot’s environment that
current systems do not have. SA also requires a sense of salience, what is important based

“Look”

on a shared understanding among teammates. Better learning is needed to develop a more
human-like hierarchical understanding of object categories in the first place as well as to refine
perception capabilities in the field.

Efficient Proactive In

- Vision: robots interact with each other and especially with Soldiers in an efficient and proactive

teraction with Humans

way relevant to the evolving situation.
- Existing robotic systems are notoriously opaque and distrusted. They cannot explain what

“Talk”

they are doing, primarily because they do not have meta-cognition; in other words, they do not
have a model of their own behavior. Current systems also lack the ability to understand human
(i.e., semantic) communication of orders or other information

Safe, Secure, and
Adaptive Movement

- Vision: robots that move on orders or their own initiative from one tactical position to the
next with little or no reliance on metric inputs such as GPS. They can move, as Soldiers do, to
semantically described locations (e.g., “third building on the left after the next intersection”).
- Current systems have insufficient descriptions, or models, of the world in which the robot is
moving. Useful movement is also hampered by the lack of task or mission context so that a

“Move”

robot may persist in trying to reach a particular location that is not needed for the mission.
Robots also need to be able to move in crowded and unpredictable environments, where exist
ing algorithmic approaches are probably intractable but new learning approaches may work.

Interaction with the
Physical World

- Vision: robots are able to observe objects at close quarters to enable 3D interaction with them.
They pick-up and move objects, either upon semantic direction or their own initiative.
- The above four capabilities (think-look-move-talk) largely enable the performance of the
main goal of the mission – the “work” the robot is to do. The work most often involves direct

“Work”

physical interaction with the world: entering and searching a building or vehicle, loading and
delivering supplies, inspecting a suspected IED, etc. There is generally great uncertainty about
the objects with which the robot is attempting to interact.

Table 5. Research and Development Focus for
Military UGVs.54
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The fact that the ONR, DSB, and Army S&T studies
identified similar sets of technology areas and goals for
AWS provides confidence that their efforts are in the
right direction and that they can support each other.
However, any plan to implement technology comes
with a price tag that must compete in an increasingly
contentious federal budget.
Budget Resources.
The DoD Integrated Roadmap included a projec
tion of unmanned systems budgets from Fiscal Year
(FY) 2014 to FY 2018 based on information available
at its publication, included herein as Figure 3. Clear
ly, the budget heavily favors air-based systems with
their projected portions accounting for 94.2 percent of
the total development costs and 91.5 percent of total
procurement costs. Of course, some of these costs in
clude unmanned air systems for the Army, Navy, and
Marines as well as for the Air Force. In stark contrast
is the lesser budget priority for unmanned ground
systems, which account for less than 1 percent of to
tal development costs and less than 2 percent of total
procurement costs.
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Figure 3. DoD Unmanned Systems Funding per
Integrated Roadmap.55
While there is insufficient information to repro
duce the method by which Figure 3 was tabulated,
we can compare some of its projected values to those
recently submitted as part of the FY 2016 DoD budget
request. Procurement of UAV dominates the requests
for unmanned systems and it includes $960 million for
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
as well as $1.87 billion for procurement. The procure
ment funding buys 51 UAVs: 15 MQ-1 Gray Eagles
(based on Predator) for the Army; 29 MQ-9 Reapers
for the Air Force; 3 MQ-4C Tritons (based on Global
Hawk) for the Navy; and 4 RQ-21 Blackjacks (based
on Shadow) for the Marine Corps.56 The Army uses
the Gray Eagle as “a dedicated, assured, multi-mis
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sion Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) fielded to all
ten Army Divisions to support the commander’s com
bat operations.”57
Funding for various unmanned system program
elements are spread through the Army’s FY 2016 bud
get request, and it is beyond the scope of this Paper
to delve into all the details therein. However, in addi
tion to the UAV and related costs already identified,
there are two noteworthy items for unmanned ground
systems. First is the request for $40.4 million RDT&E
in support of the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(Program Element 0604641A) which is described as
“man-packable, miniature (<25-lbs), highly mobile,
unmanned robotic system with advanced sensors/
mission modules for dismounted Soldiers.”58 The pro
gram element includes the ability to evaluate readily
available hardware such as COTS to support emerging
warfighter requirements as part of the Robot Enhance
ment Program.59 Second is an indication of the Army’s
intent to pursue ground AWS that can apply lethal
capabilities listed under Program Element 0603827A,
Soldier Systems-Advanced Development, Project S54,
Small Arms Improvement:
FY16 New Start Armaments for Robots: Will initiate
the intelligence/networking and weapons design and
functions for a man-in-the-loop, small caliber defen
sive armaments system on an unmanned ground ve
hicle including the Warfighter/Robot interface.60

No further details are available, but this would ap
pear to support the intent of the Integrated Roadmap
technology area of weaponry development specific to
unmanned platforms.
The budget challenges are significant as FY 2016
and beyond must deal with the loss of OCO funding
as well as possible impacts from sequestration. Spend
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ing for UGVs must support the bridging strategy to
divest older systems and limit sustainment costs on
the systems selected to remain in the inventory. This
will leave little funding available to develop, procure,
and deploy future unmanned systems, thus it is im
portant to understand how these systems may be used
in military operations to ensure investments are made
with prudence.
OPERATIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
One could argue that the operational use of AWS
thus far has been viewed largely as an ends to a means
focused on a specific mission, such as UGVs support
ing counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) ef
forts. But the Army Research Laboratory RCTA over
view brief offered a different vision for unmanned
systems—“A Paradigm shift—from Tool to Team
Member”61 This section addresses two questions re
lated to such a vision: What can be achieved via au
tonomy within the range of military operations? What
missions can be enhanced by incorporating AWS?
Mission Parameters.
The parameters for potential mission areas for
AWS can be found in each of four JCAs identified in
the Integrated Roadmap. For battlespace awareness,
AWS may extend mission endurance and provide
persistent ISR in all operational domains that could be
readily shared with similar systems to further enhance
their effectiveness. Force application capabilities have
already been proven in combat by UAVs conducting
offensive operations against high-value targets. UGVs
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are also projected to have lethal applications, such
as armed reconnaissance, as well as nonlethal opera
tions, such as crowd control. For protection capabili
ties, unmanned systems can assume risky missions,
such as firefighting and decontamination, as well as
continue to refine methods for handling sophisticated
high explosives. For logistics, unmanned systems can
facilitate transportation and resupply tasks as well as
support routine maintenance, such as inspections and
refueling.62
Regarding future UGV missions, the DSB assesses
that both the Army and Marine Corp are interested
in achieving lower risk to humans; accessibility to
areas not suitable for humans; enhanced sensor ca
pability and mobility; and battle formations that pur
posely combine warfighters with AWS units.63 In the
same study, the DSB asserted that the application of
unmanned systems this century has been ad hoc in
nature:
Due to the understandable pressures of war, un
manned systems were often fielded before CONOPS
were fully developed or understood; deployment
support structures (sustainment, service structures,
etc.) were immature; and the lack of understanding
or validating (testing) maturity to support tactical and
operational challenges in remote theaters have further
complicated progress.64

To address the warfighter needs for unmanned sys
tems that better integrate into the full range of military
operations, let us consider a more deliberate approach
to their integration into existing force structures.
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Integration into Force Structure.
DoD Directive 3000.09 requires commanders of the
combatant commands to integrate AWS into their op
erational mission planning and also charges them to
“identify warfighter priorities and operational needs
that may be met by” AWS through established pro
cedures overseen by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.65 The Integrated Roadmap posits that this man
date can lead to systems that perform beyond mere
substitution for manned systems, thus allowing new
formations and tactics that are more agile and maneu
verable. It also suggests that unmanned systems could
be used as low-cost disposable assets that expect at
trition, a concept that reverses the current focus on
procuring complex and expensive systems that often
require risk-adverse planning.66 But how does one de
termine the best types of unmanned systems to pro
cure? And what is the best way to blend these systems
with human warfighters into a cohesive force?
As discussed earlier, FCS was the Army’s modern
ization program until its cancellation in 2009. But in
the years prior to this, the program made significant
strides toward answering these force integration ques
tions. The FCS Test Master Plan addressed not only
the individual capabilities of its eight manned and
10 unmanned vehicles, but also how the entire fam
ily of systems worked together to accomplish a given
mission.67 Also, the FCS program formed a unique
Evaluation Brigade Combat Team at Fort Bliss, Texas,
to support early operational assessments and testing
of FCS elements as well as the complete system com
prised of soldiers working together with manned and
unmanned platforms on the ground and in the air.68

26

Currently, the Army UGV Campaign Plan for
modernization organizes systems into four classes of
vehicles (CoV): Soldier transportable, vehicle trans
portable, self-transportable, and appliqué.69 The de
scriptions of the CoV and system types within each
category are presented in Table 6. Even during mod
ernization, some traditions remain and the Army prac
tice of using mules is updated with the Common Mo
bility Platform/Multi-Mission UGV envisioned “as
vehicles to serve as robotic ‘mules’ to take on multiple
soldiers’ loads.”70 The top priority for technology ar
eas to support the UGV Campaign Plan was assessed
to be autonomy, with envisioned mission applications
for:
area clearance, route clearance (marks and detects),
convoy, soldier follower, manned/unmanned team
ing, situational awareness and navigation in a [global
positioning system] denied environment. Also for
route detection, planning, and maneuver capabilities
over soldier passable terrain.71

Emphasizing autonomy development would help
mitigate two of the primary challenges assessed by
the DBS for UGVs in combat operations: “negotiating
terrain and obstacles on the battlefield, and perform
ing kinetic operations within the Rules of Engagement
(ROE).”72

27

Class of Vehicles (CoV)

CoV Description and System Types
- UGV system with weight not exceeding 35 pounds and with forms that allow them to
be carried by Soldiers or Marines for extended periods of time over varying terrains.
- The majority of soldier transportable systems are used for surveillance, reconnais

Soldier Transportable

sance missions, and standoff IED detection and defeat.
- Continued advancements in antenna design, autonomy, miniaturization, power
sources, and control mechanisms are required in order for these capabilities to be
fully realized.
- System types: Crew Served Bot ; Small Bot; Micro Bot ; Nano Bot
- Vehicle transportable unmanned systems are heavier and require a prime mover for
transportation to and from a mission.
- Future requirements for vehicle transportable systems are expected to include more
advanced, reliable and autonomous area and route clearance robotic vehicles as well

Vehicle Transportable

as humanoid like systems.
- Continued advancements in autonomy (to include intelligence understanding and
decision making), power systems, and enhanced mine detection and neutralization
techniques and methods are needed.
- System types: Mounted or Towed; Armed; Humanoid
- Self transportable systems can move under their own power, up to road march
speeds, without assistance from a prime mover or other sources.
- Self transportable systems are not manned systems with appliqué kits applied, rather
they are systems that have been developed explicitly as unmanned vehicles.

Self Transportable

- Continued advancements in autonomy, sensors and sensor fusion are required in
order for these capabilities to be realized.
- System types: Soldier Follower—Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT); Medium
Wingman—Striker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT); Heavy Wingman—Heavy Brigade
Combat Team (HBCT); Squad Member.
- Appliqué COVs are systems that can be used to convert fielded and future manned
systems into unmanned systems.
- These systems are envisioned as ‘kits’ that include all the hardware (sensors, cables,
actuators, control station, etc.) and software required to fully operate and monitor the

Appliqué

selected vehicle remotely.
- Key advancements are required in the areas of autonomy, processing, size, weight
and power (SWaP), sensor development, and sensor fusion for this CoV to be fully
matured.
- System types: Remote Operation; Supervised Autonomy; Full Autonomy; Exoskeleton

Table 6. Army Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(UGV) Campaign Plan.73
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The DoD Roadmap (2013) makes it clear that force
integration for unmanned systems must not be con
fined to single-domain applications. Rather, it pro
mulgates the development of Manned-Unmanned
Systems Team (MUM-T) as an essential part of the
strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region. The MUM-T
force would be smaller and more agile, thus providing
key capabilities to address A2/AD challenges such as:
• Defeating explosive ground surface, sub-sur
face (tunnel), and sea hazards from greater
standoff distances;
• Assuring mobility to support multiple points of
entry;
• Enabling movement and maneuver for project
ing offensive operations;
• Establishing and sustaining the shore lines of
communications required to follow forces and
logistics;
• Protecting austere combat outposts;
• Providing persistent surveillance to detect and
neutralize threats and hazards within single- to
triple-canopy and urban terrain.74
To develop and refine the MUM-T concept, the
Army’s Program Executive Office-Aviation estab
lished the Manned Unmanned Systems Integration
Capability (MUSIC) Exercise program. The first exer
cise, MUSIC I, was conducted in September 2011 at
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah. In addition to MUM
T capabilities, the exercise also tested ground control
stations and remote video terminals. Lessons learned
from MUSIC I were used by the product office to help
improve usability, reliability, integration, and config
uration control of future systems.75

29

Success in the MUM-T force depends not only on
the interactions between human and machines, but
also on the interoperability among the machines. As an
example of ongoing effort to improve interoperability,
consider the DoD Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task
Force (UAS TF) that was established in April 2010 in a
charter signed by USD(AT&L) and the Deputy Secre
tary of Defense to address many issues in this area.76
The UAS TF is divided into four principal integrated
product teams (IPTs): Interoperability; Airspace In
tegration; Frequency and Bandwidth; and Logistics
and Sustainment. The Task Force also has Advisory
Groups for Research and Development and Payloads
and Sensors.77 For the critical area of interoperability,
the Interoperability-IPT “continues to address the 29
prioritized Joint interoperability capability gaps iden
tified in the approved Unmanned Interoperability Ini
tiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment (CBA).”78
Doctrine.
DoD Directive 3000.09 mandates the development
of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs) for AWS applications as well as their periodic
review to ensure they are appropriate for changes in
realistic operational conditions. It emphasizes that the
doctrine and tactics must “have demonstrated the ca
pability to allow commanders and operators to exer
cise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use
of force” as well as meet all legal and safety rules.79
Ideally, the development and promulgation of doc
trine should receive high priority among warfighters,
but this is not always the case.
In his book Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution
and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century, author P. W.
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Singer devotes a chapter to examining how the United
States might fight with robots. He cited a survey of U.S.
military officers that “identified developing a strategy
and doctrine [for using robots in combat] as the third
least important aspect to figure out.”80 His observation
provides some insight into the ad hoc applications of
AWS in combat thus far despite policy that dictates a
more informed approach.
What should AWS doctrine address? Perhaps a
good starting point is to embrace a mission-focused
autonomy vision crafted by the ONR: “Develop au
tonomous control that intelligently understands and
reasons about its environment relative to its objectives
and independently takes appropriate actions.”81 How
ever, these actions in a mission will result from human
direction in two broad teamwork styles: remote pres
ence or taskable agents. As its name implies, remote
presence allows humans to perceive and act through
unmanned systems at a distance, while taskable
agents allows the unmanned system to autonomously
complete a human-directed mission task.82
Starting with the foundation of remote presence
and taskable agents, there are numerous doctrinal nu
ances that must be addressed concerning how these
principles are applied in operations of increasing
complexity. What is the primary operational entity for
a given mission? Are humans the supported force ele
ment, or are they supporting the unmanned system? 83
Do these roles change at different phases in the mis
sion? How autonomous are AWS allowed to oper
ate when factoring not only inherent capability, but
also commander’s intent, laws of war, and rules of
engagement?
Probably the best attempt at addressing such AWS
doctrine issues thus far occurred at Fort Bliss, Texas,
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as part of the operational assessment of fledging FCS
operations.84 But these experiments were limited to
few soldiers and unmanned systems. However, as we
move toward more of a MUM-T structure, it may be
come common or a single soldier or system to operate
multiple AWS simultaneously; an extreme application
of this would be swarming.
The DSB report on autonomy discussed two possi
ble types of swarming coordination: cooperation and
collaboration. Cooperation may emulate swarming
behavior seen in nature among large numbers of ani
mals executing simple tasks based on instinct, such as
ants foraging for food. Cognitive and communication
abilities for cooperation are basic and may be reduced
to a small number of stimulus-response commands.
Collaboration is a more intentional form of teamwork
that requires more sophisticated sensing and commu
nication as well as cognitive understanding of other
members of the swarm.85 Using AWS in swarms may
provide greatly enhanced mass and maneuver capabil
ities as well as allow for the use of lower cost systems
in large enough numbers to account for attrition and
possibly overwhelm any traditional defenses. How
ever, to be successful it is likely that such formations
will communicate and react at speeds and complexity
beyond human comprehension; this introduces a limi
tation that doctrine should address. 86
Doctrine must also address how U.S. human/
AWS teams interact with external parties. Such inter
action may involve coalition teaming efforts, adver
sary countermeasures, and incidental contact with
innocent noncombatants.87 To better understand
the possible implications of such interaction, let us
now examine AWS applications in the international
environment.
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International Efforts.
The global proliferation of UAVs as depicted in
Figure 2 and discussed earlier applied to all forms of
aviation. The Bard Center for Study of the Drone re
ports that by 2013, 87 countries are either developing
or acquiring military drones.88 Filtering this number
down, a 2014 RAND Corporation report found 23
countries are potentially developing armed UAVs,
of which eight countries are working on systems that
would meet Category I criteria of the Missile Technol
ogy Control Regime (MTCR)—a range of at least 300
kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. Of
these eight countries, three are MTCR members (Rus
sia, Turkey, and the United States) and five are not
members (China, India, Iran, Taiwan, and the United
Arab Emirates).
Of note is that Israel, the largest exporter of UAVs
(to over 42 countries), is not an MTCR member. Israel
is assessed as developing MTCR Category II UAVs—
the same range criteria as Category I, but with less
payload.89 Israel also exports ground systems like the
Guardium unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), a semiautonomous system designed primarily for routine
patrols, but also able “to autonomously react to un
scheduled events, in line with a set of guidelines spe
cifically programmed for the site characteristics and
security doctrine.”90 China is also an exporter of AWS,
according to the DSB which noted that after their ini
tial marketing at the Zhuhai air show in 2007, “now
every major manufacturer for the Chinese military has
a research center devoted to unmanned systems.”91
Other countries of interest for exporting AWS include
Russia and Iran.92
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Given the crowded international environment for
military unmanned systems, how does the United
States extend its force integration of AWS to include
allies, coalition partners, and friends? DoD Directive
3000.09 allows for the “international sales or transfers
of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon sys
tems” in accordance with existing U.S. law.93 Chapter
8 of the Integrated Roadmap identifies three primary
methods of international cooperation for unmanned
systems: international agreements for joint RDT&E;
foreign military sales; and direct commercial sales. It
also provides details regarding the rigorous control
processes established by Congress to ensure proper
arms export control, technology transfer, and foreign
disclosure of sensitive information.94
An example of international cooperation is the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance
Ground Surveillance (AGS), a system that uses the
U.S. Global Hawk UAV to give NATO commanders
comprehensive ground situational awareness. It was
used successfully to help protect civilians in Libya
during NATO operations there in 2011.95 The DoD FY
2016 budget includes $198 million for RDT&E efforts
for the AGS.96
Individual countries have benefited from U.S.
partnerships with AWS as well. High-demand sys
tems such as the RQ-1 Predator and MQ-1 Reaper
UAVs built by General Atomics have been purchased
by many countries, including NATO allies Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, and
UK.97 The Australian Army acknowledged the ben
efits of procuring “capabilities such as the Switch
blade system (an armed, disposable micro-UAV)” to
provide “opportunities for the [Australian] Army to
enhance the individual lethality of its soldiers in an
austere budget environment.” 98
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How is NATO approaching the implementation of
AWS into future operations? A series of workshops
and seminars led by NATO Headquarters Supreme Al
lied Commander Transformation have focused on the
objective “to improve awareness and understanding
of autonomous systems, promote interoperability and
provide guidance for the development of, use of, and
defence against, autonomous systems.”99 Their work
includes recommendations to adopt precise language
when dealing with AWS, specifically the introduction
of “autonomous functioning” as reference to “the abil
ity of a system, platform, or software, to complete a
task without human intervention, using behaviours
resulting from the interaction of computer program
ming with the external environment.”100 Accordingly,
the report recommendations include “rather than
emphasising the fact that a system employs autono
mous functions, focus should be placed on the level
of human control and accountability and the type of
decision being autonomised.”101 Such clarification ap
pears to be in concert with the DoD policy guideline
to ensure the exercise of appropriate levels of human
judgment when using AWS.102
The challenges of integrating U.S. military un
manned systems into operations with other govern
mental entities are not limited to international military
forces. There are also issues that DoD must consider
related to military AWS operations in the continental
United States and bordering countries. For example,
a 2012 GAO report examined the use of UAVs by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support
national security operations along the U.S. southwest
border. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
granted DHS authority to fly such missions, but were
concerned about safety in the national airspace, since
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the UAVs had limited capabilities to avoid other
aircraft.103
The January 2013 USD(AT&L) report to Congress
on unmanned systems acknowledges that “current
DoD UAS lack the same capabilities as manned air
craft to safely and efficiently integrate into the Na
tional Airspace System (NAS).”104 The DoD UAS Task
Force includes an integrated product team dedicated
to address this problem:
The Airspace Integration IPT (AI-IPT) seeks to im
prove airspace access for UAS operations and training
requirements in support of homeland defense, home
land security, and defense support of civil authorities.
The AI-IPT reviews and assesses operational require
ments; identifies and develops acquisition solutions;
assists in the development of UAS technical stan
dards; and recommend straining and policy changes
necessary to integrate UAS into necessary classes of
airspace.105

The current process allows the FAA to issue a Cer
tificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) for govern
ment entities that desire to fly a UAS in civil airspace
for purposes such as law enforcement, firefighting,
border patrol, disaster relief, search and rescue, and
military training. The FAA evaluates the COA request
for safety and, if approved, defines the allowed air
space and any special provisions. The numbers of
COAs granted has risen from 146 in 2009 to 609 in
2014.106 To further complicate the situation, as of May
2014, 35 states have introduced legislation to restrict
the use of drones by government; 12 state legislatures
have actually some formal measures.107 Returning full
circle back to the international environment, it is im
portant to note that the European Union (EU) is also

36

considering airspace management restrictions for
unmanned air systems.108 Also, a March 2015 GAO
report compares the evolution of airspace restric
tions for UAS operation amongst the United States,
Australia, Canada, France, and UK.109
Strategic Geopolitical Challenges.
What long-term strategic effects on American na
tional security policy are likely to result from increased
use of military AWS? When examining this question,
one must ask if the AWS are simply an evolution of
warfare, or whether they may represent a revolution
in military affairs.110 The 2014 report from NATO Al
lied Command Transformation recommends serious
study regarding the impact of autonomous system to
the character of war, specifically “the potential of au
tonomous technologies to impact the nature and con
duct of war.”111 Consistent with this theme, the report
concludes that one of the study’s most important find
ings is the need to consider the proper balance of hu
man control versus machine control. Toward this end,
the report recommends this be done at policy levels
and include the following factors:
• The type of decision being transferred to the
machine;
• The command relationship between human
and machine;
• The type of operating environment;
• The type of risk incurred if the machine makes
the wrong decision; and,
• The particular military benefit of autonomiza
tion of certain functions (e.g. precision perfor
mance, faster decisionmaking, reduction of risk
to personnel).112
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In his study of the effectiveness of recent armed
drone strikes, author James Walsh considers the long
term implications and asks “How will other countries
and insurgent organizations respond to the use of
drones as a U.S. tool of counterinsurgency?”113 Use of
drones can be seductive, since such operations require
fewer “boots on the ground” and thus diminish the
risk of U.S. casualties. However, a 2014 RAND Corpo
ration report notes that this reduced fear of loss may
“change the calculus for the employment of force” to
lower the threshold of intervention and warns that
“as armed UAVs spread, other countries may be more
likely to intervene in similar circumstances.”114 A
2014 study of future warfare by the Australian Army
echoed the need for carefully examining the poten
tially profound changes that autonomous technology
may have in future wars. The report singles out armed
AWS, stressing that “significant questions remain con
cerning the ethics and legality of arming autonomous
platforms and empowering these systems to use lethal
force.”115
On the domestic political front, Walsh poses a ques
tion that would please Clausewitz: “How the reliance
on drone strikes will influence perceptions on the part
of the American public of the acceptability and desir
ability of the use of force.”116 Certainly, the adminis
tration of President Obama has greatly escalated the
use of armed drones in the application of U.S. force,
including use “over at least 475 decisions to carry out
lethal force in nations beyond the ones where U.S.
military forces are deployed on the ground.”117 An ap
parent side effect to this increased use is reduced op
erational and political costs at home, a trend that may
make the decision to use force easier in the future.
Many respected government experts have questioned
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if the authorities granted by such measures as the War
Power Act have been interpreted too liberally in these
operations. To address such concerns, let us examine
the related legal issues.
LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
What are legally acceptable uses of autonomous
weapon systems within the range of military opera
tions? To examine this, we will first look at existing
international legal conventions including the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC). We will then review recent
assessments by the UN LOAC. Next, we focus on the
concept of human control and judgement as it ap
plies to AWS. Finally, we shall review some current
vignettes as well as consider some potential trends for
the future.
International Law and LOAC.
Although the widespread use of AWS in warfare
is still in its infancy, there have been serious concerns
raised regarding the legality of their application. What
forms the legal foundation for the use of AWS in war
fare? DoD Directive 3000.09 explicitly assigns respon
sibility to the General Counsel of DoD (GC, DoD) to
“provide for guidance in and coordination of legal
reviews of weapon systems submitted in accordance
with” provisions of the directive.118 This includes re
view of the Law of War (often called law of armed
conflict, or LOAC) per the provisions of DoD Directive
2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, which:
encompasses all international law for the conduct of
hostilities binding on the United States or its indi
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vidual citizens, including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and
applicable customary international law.119

To address the growing controversy regarding
drone attacks, internationally recognized legal expert
Michael Schmitt published a detailed legal analysis
that examined both the jus as bellum (right to war)
and jus in bello (international humanitarian law) prin
ciples. In general, he concluded “that there is little
reason to treat drones as distinct from other weapons
systems with regard to the legal consequences of their
employment.”120 He also addressed the debate over
U.S. drone attacks over countries whose government
did not grant permission, such as Pakistan. Schmitt
summarized the U.S. justification as one derived from
Article 51 of the UN Charter (inherent right of self-de
fense), stating that “the victim state [the U.S.] may act
militarily in self-defense, including the use of drones,
to put an end to the unlawful activities” that the terri
torial state (Pakistan) fails to stop.121 Schmitt’s analysis
included two other interesting concepts related to the
use of drones. First, because of their capabilities for
long duration loiter and precision strike, drones may
in some cases be the most legally responsible choice of
force application. Second, drone operators located in
the United States remain legitimate targets of enemy
attack.122
When considering the use of armed UAVs to tar
get specific individuals or groups, the Bard College’s
Center for Study of the Drone assessment resonated
with Schmitt’s arguments. Specifically, the Center
surmises that:
under international humanitarian law, the United
States may use lethal force against individuals outside
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of an active war zone, but only if these individuals are
actively involved in hostilities that pose an imminent
threat to the United States or its interests.123

Recent military doctrine of UK also echoed Schmitt’s
observation that AWS may in some cases be the most
responsible choice. They offer the argument regarding
the Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM)
employed in Afghanistan that “the potential damage
caused by not using C-RAM in its automatic mode jus
tifies the level of any anticipated collateral damage.”124
Assessments by the United Nations.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on legal is
sues limited to AWS in the air domain; a more general
discussion of armed AWS in all domains is necessary
to properly assess the legal implications. Toward this
objective, the UN has sponsored two meetings, in May
2014 and April 2015, under provisions of its Conven
tion on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) fo
cused on “questions related to emerging technologies
in the area of lethal autonomous weapons [LAWS].”125
The May 2014 Meeting of Experts on LAWS was at
tended by representatives from 87 countries as well
as over 25 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and academe. In addition to discussing legal aspects
of LAWS, the agenda included sessions on technical
issues, ethics and sociology, and operational and mili
tary aspects. Since this was the inaugural UN meet
ing on LAWS, it generally focused on identifying the
myriad issues and working toward a common lexicon
to guide future discussion toward solutions.
The final report of the May 2014 meeting indicated
that many of the delegates were trying to consider the
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balance between “the potential for rapid technological
developments in autonomous weapons to radically
transform the nature of warfare” and “the necessity
of recognizing the significance of the peaceful uses
of autonomous technologies in the civilian field.”126
While there was no agreement on any significant is
sue, several themes emerged in the technical sessions,
to include “the notion of meaningful human control
could be useful to address the question of autonomy”
as well as “the concept of human involvement in de
sign, testing, reviews, training and use” of LAWS.127
The sessions on legal aspects revealed diverse views
on the possibility for LAWS to comply with interna
tional humanitarian law as well as the adequacy of
existing international law to address potential uses
of LAWS. Another provocative issue regarded how
responsibility for the use of LAWS would be deter
mined and whether there may be an “accountability
gap” that requires an examination of responsibilities
for not only LAWS users, but also for those involved
with the design and manufacturing.128
Based on the progress of their 2014 meeting, CCW
leadership organized a second meeting to continue
the dialogue on LAWS. In preparation for this meet
ing, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
published a primer for delegates of the second meet
ing based in part on key issues raised in the first meet
ing. The primer encourages that “States should follow
these [LAWS] discussions with a more focused exami
nation of the strategic stability issues surrounding
LAWS, perhaps in the form of a working group.”129
The issues listed by CNAS included: the current ex
istence of LAWS; the legality, morality, and predict
ability of LAWS; how LAWS affect human dignity
and ethics; and stabilizing and destabilizing nature of
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LAWS in warfare. They also highlighted the concept
of “meaning human control” as an important part of
addressing the other challenge areas and proposed a
working definition:
There are three essential components of meaningful
human control:
1. Human operators are making informed, conscious
decisions about the use of weapons.
2. Human operators have sufficient information to en
sure the lawfulness of the action they are taking, given
what they know about the target, the weapon, and the
context for action.
3. The weapon is designed and tested, and human op
erators are properly trained, to ensure effective con
trol over the use of the weapon.

These standards help ensure accountability, moral
responsibility, and the ability to safely control the
weapon.130
The second Meeting of Experts on LAWS was held
April 13-17, 2015, and included delegates from over
90 countries as well as from the EU and 15 NGOs.
Observers at the proceedings noted that there was
positive discussion, but still no true consensus on
any significant issues. At the most fundamental level,
there remains some disagreement as to what consti
tutes LAWS, especially with regard to existing sys
tems, such as armed drones. There was also discus
sion of the dilemma surrounding the dual-use nature
of autonomy and the concern that a universal ban on
LAWS-related technologies may inadvertently outlaw
some beneficial applications as well.131
While the formal report on the 2015 meeting is
still being written and reviewed within UN chan
nels, many of the written statements of contributing
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countries have posted on the CCW website. As one
might expect, both meetings included representatives
from the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (China, France, Russian, UK, and the United
States), any of which could wield veto power over
enactment of any eventual LAWS-related security
resolutions. The opening statement by the UK clearly
established their viewpoint: “From our perspective,
to discuss LAWS is to discuss means and methods of
warfare. As such, international humanitarian law pro
vides the appropriate paradigm for discussion.”132
The U.S. delegation clarified the U.S. position that
the conference discussion should only involve future
systems and “emerging technologies,” and that for the
purposes of the meeting, “we are not referring to re
motely piloted aircraft, which as their name implies
are not autonomous weapons, or other existing weap
ons systems.”133 The statement included “The United
States has a process in place, applicable to all weapon
systems, which is designed to ensure weapons oper
ate safely, reliably and are understood by their human
operators”134 and further noted that DoD Directive
3000.09 imposes additional scrutiny for any poten
tial LAWS, but “neither encourages nor prohibits the
development of such future systems.”135
Human Control and Judgment.
In his closing remarks at the 2015 LAWS meetings,
Paul Scharre of CNAS commented “There seems to be
an emerging consensus that human control and judg
ment is needed. And most seem to agree that there
should be a necessary quality to that control, just as
there is with the use of weapons today.”136 Although
one might dismiss this as a self-fulfilling prophecy
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facilitated by the CNAS primer, it is clear the issue of
human control and judgment is an essential element
to include in any deliberations of AWS. For example,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
held an Expert Meeting of Autonomous Weapon Sys
tems in March 2014, the results of which informed
the LAWS meetings.137 The ICRC meeting included
representatives from 21 countries and 13 NGOs and
their findings included “recognition of the importance
of maintaining human control over selecting and at
tacking targets, although there is less clarity on what
would constitute ‘meaningful human control’.”138 To
help explore this conceptual ambiguity, presentations
given at the meeting included topics on Human Su
pervisory Control; Distinction, Proportionality, and
Precaution; and Accountability and Responsibility.
Pointing to ethical considerations beyond legal fac
tors, the report notes “it is argued that the manner
in which people are killed matters, even if they are
lawful targets.”139
The 2014 NATO Allied Command Transformation
report also addresses the importance of considering
human control, and notes in general terms “the neces
sary level of human control depends on the particular
situation, applicable legal constraints, and the level of
tolerable risk.”140 For unarmed AWS, risk assessment
may be based on the potential for collateral damage
based on the size of the system and the possible kinet
ic energy if it crashed.141 The report further notes the
more severe restriction case of LAWS application and
concludes, “The idea that autonomous systems could
be autonomously deciding on the use of lethal force
against humans, is perceived by some as being incom
patible with the dictates of public conscience.”142
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Toward the Future.
Despite the insistence of the U.S. delegation to the
recent UN meeting that armed drones are not associ
ated with LAWS issues, it may be prudent to consider
the opinions of the rest of the world. The first openly
acknowledged successful use of an armed U.S. UAV
was a Predator in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.143
The legal justification for the attack was based in large
part on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force”
passed as a joint resolution by Congress following the
9/11 attacks.144 A report by the RAND Corporation
found that since that first use, there have been eight
other conflicts in which the United States used armed
UAVs. Per the report’s assessment of these conflicts,
three did not occur in a recognized war zone (Paki
stan, Yemen, and Somalia), and three did not have
clear congressional authorization (Yemen, Libya, and
Somalia). Also, the report posited that:
the greatest concerns about U.S. use of armed UAVs
appear to arise from operations outside active war
zones, less-transparent operations, lack of clarity
about congressional authorizations, and targeting of
those not clearly identified as combatants or al Qaeda
leaders.145

In a Parameters article, W. Andrew Terrill explored
the use of drones over Yemen in further detail and
noted that:
despite their successes, the use of US drones is deeply
unpopular with many Yemenis, and anger over their
employment is one of the primary drawbacks to us
ing these systems. One of the most important rea
sons for Yemeni anger is a concern about national
sovereignty.146
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Terrill noted the resulting reluctance of (former)
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to publicly acknowledge
Yemen cooperation with the United States for drone
strikes. Even with the 2012 election of President Abed
Rabbu Hadi and a more openly cooperative relation
ship with the United States, Terrill recommended that
“US leadership correspondingly needs to avoid view
ing its drone program as a panacea for Yemen’s terror
ism and insurgency problems.”147 In a rather prophetic
conclusion, Terrill asserted:
In sum, drones are on probation with the Yemeni pub
lic, and even a friendly Yemeni president can still be
pressured to disallow drone strikes. Drones can help
manage instability but they cannot, by themselves,
create stability in Yemen.148

Since the publication of the Parameters article in 2013,
the government of Yemen has devolved into civil war
in March 2015 with rebel forces backed by Iran forc
ing President Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia.149 Granted,
the dynamics in Yemen go far beyond a simple cause
and-effect equation with armed UAVs, and the even
tual benefit, or detriment, of their use requires further
study.
But even in a legitimate conflict with the support
of local government, commanders and operators of
AWS need to minimize collateral damage. The 2014
Australian Army Future Land Warfare Report notes
that “the increasing difficulty of discriminating be
tween combatants and noncombatants is likely to
require more extensive targeting preparation and an
increased need for target audience analysis.”150 Thus,
governments need to be attuned to public awareness
of battlespace operations and any implicit promise of
war without casualties. Enabled by ubiquitous social
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media, the report suggests “the gap between percep
tions of bloodless precision and the reality of close
combat will be difficult to bridge.”151
It will be even tougher to develop appropriate ar
tificial intelligence for AWS to discriminate targets for
application of lethal force. The challenge is so great
and the implications so severe that the European Par
liament has called on EU member states to consider
to “ban the development, production, and use of fully
autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be car
ried out without human intervention.”152 But even if
these countries and the United States impose such
restrictions, potential adversaries may not follow con
straints. The 2014 Australian Army report sums this
up well: “Legal, moral or ethical constraints, which
are deemed to uphold the legitimacy and legality of
Western military operations, are unlikely to restrict
the actions of potential adversaries.”153
The path forward for the United States will con
tinue to be watched closely by the rest of the world.
As a 2014 report for the Council for Foreign Relations
cautions:
Given that the United States is the lead actor and ex
emplar of drone use, its interpretation of international
law, public articulation of its position, and future be
havior will set a precedent on which other countries
are like to base their own behavior.154

These strategic decisions will have implications for
the future of all AWS, not just UAVs. Rather than fo
cusing exclusively on the myriad tactic legal details
involved with AWS and LAWS, perhaps the United
States should also promulgate a broader vision of
ethical behavior that can help promote a culture of
responsible use of force. Rebecca Crootof of Yale Law
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School studied international law for autonomous
weapons in the context of LOAC and beyond. Her rec
ommendation is straightforward: “Given that we do
not yet fully understand the benefits and risks posed
by autonomous weapons systems, developing flexible
codes of conduct may be preferable to negotiating a
treaty.”155 Indeed, developing such codes of conduct
requires a dialogue that extends beyond the low bar of
the interpretation of laws and considers the relevant
ethical issues.
ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
What should be the ethically acceptable and advis
able uses of autonomous weapon systems within the
range of military operations? What moral principles
should form the foundation of AWS development and
operation? We explore these questions by first review
ing the ongoing work for developing ethical frame
works for AWS. We then consider the varying cul
tural views that AWS applications may evoke. Next,
we analyze the potential reduction or proliferation in
warfare that widespread use of AWS may introduce.
Finally, we look toward the future and contemplate
potential long-term effects on national security.
Ethical Frameworks.
The report of the 2014 LAWS Expert Meeting in
cluded a section that summarized a session held to
examine ethical and sociological aspects. Several note
worthy themes were identified for future discourse
centered on the inherent deficiencies of inculcating
ethics into machines. Many agreed that “the possi
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bility for a robotic system to acquire capabilities of
‘moral reasoning’ and ‘judgment’ was highly ques
tionable.”156 Some of the perceived difficulties in this
endeavor would include the pragmatic task of writ
ing software with appropriate values and ethics that
could be exercised in complex and dynamic environ
ments. The report also questioned how autonomous
systems might respond to moral dilemmas. Finally,
even if these challenges were surmounted, could
humans fully trust such systems and would they be
acceptable to society writ large?
Internationally recognized organizations that have
dedicated efforts to examine the ethics involved with
LAWS include the Human Rights Watch and the In
ternational Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), part of the
Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School. Since
November 2012, these groups joined to publish three
reports on the dangers posed by “killer robots,” which
they define as fully autonomous weapons that “pos
sess the ability to select and engage their targets with
out meaningful human control.”157 Their first report,
Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots (No
vember 2012) builds a case for the possibility of killer
robots becoming reality within 20 to 30 years as well
as an urgency for their recommendation for appropri
ate national and international measures “to prohibit
the development, production, and use of fully au
tonomous weapons.”158 The second report, Shaking the
Foundations, The Human Rights Implications of Killer Ro
bots (May 2014) emphasizes the ethical concepts of hu
man dignity and right to life. Its conclusion includes:
Finally, as machines, fully autonomous weapons could
not comprehend or respect the inherent dignity of hu
man beings. The inability to uphold this underlying
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principle of human rights raises serious moral ques
tions about the prospect of allowing a robot to take a
human life.159

The third and most recent report, Mind the Gap: The
Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots (April 2015) fo
cuses on a very direct premise: “Because these robots
would be designed to kill, someone should be held
legally and morally accountable for unlawful killings
and other harms the weapons cause.”160 The report ar
gues that existing immunity granted to military oper
ators and contractors represent gaps in accountability
and that such failure to uphold responsibility “add to
the moral, legal, and technological case against fully
autonomous weapons and bolster the call for a ban on
their development, production, and use.”161
Two of the positions endorsed by Human Rights
Watch and IHRC complement earlier discussions in
this Paper. First is their participation in the UN LAWS
Meetings of Experts and specifically their recognition
of the role of human control. In their opening state
ment at the 2014 meeting, their representative, Steve
Goose, noted “The key to success this week will be
the beginning of the emergence of a consensus that
there should always be meaningful human control of
the targeting and kill decisions in any individual at
tack on other humans.”162 Second is a recommenda
tion from the first killer robot report that proposes a
worthwhile initiative for those involved in the devel
opment of AWS:
To Roboticists and Others Involved in the Develop
ment of Robotic Weapons
• Establish a professional code of conduct governing
the research and development of autonomous ro
botic weapons, especially those capable of becoming
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fully autonomous, in order to ensure that legal and
ethical concerns about their use in armed conflict are
adequately considered at all stages of technological
development.163

The March 2014 ICRC Expert Meeting Report in
cluded summaries of three speakers focused specifi
cally on ethical issues surrounding AWS. Professor
Ronald Arkin of the Georgia Institute of Technology
addressed the concept of ethical restraint of LAWS. He
introduced several root causes of war crimes attribut
able to human motives (such as revenge, dehuman
ization, immaturity, frustration, and pleasure) that
could be improved by the use of automated systems.
However, he admitted that autonomous measures
may also have negative impacts on squad cohesion as
well as relations with local populations. In the end, he
argued that noncombatants could benefit “though the
judicious deployment of these robotic systems, if done
carefully and thoughtfully, particularly in those com
bat situations where fighters have a greater tendency
or opportunity to stray outside IHL.”164
Dr. Peter Asaro of The New School, USA, provided
an excellent overview of seminal works of ethics and
philosophy that inform the dialogue on AWS. He not
ed the foundations set forth by the Martens Clause to
evaluate not only a new weapon system’s compliance
with IHL but also its adherence to matters of human
ity and public conscience. He also explained some of
the moral frameworks that define this, such as the UN
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as Western
philosophical tradition, such as rights-based (Kantian)
theories and virtue ethics. Based on this, he posited
that “in giving over the responsibility to make target
ing decisions to machines, we fundamentally change
the nature of the moral considerations involved in
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the use of violent force.”165 He concluded by ponder
ing the implications of allowing AWS to take human
lives, asking “As we give over the decisions of life and
death to technological systems, are we diminishing
the value of human life?”166
Finally, Dr. Peter Lee of the University of Ports
mouth (UK) posited that “such a thing as a fully auton
omous, cognisant, self-reasoning weapon system does
not exist [yet]” and thus the current dialogue about
future AWS “is necessarily shaped by two things:
perceptions of the nearest equivalents (drones, cur
rently remotely piloted), and the influence of science
fiction and the Hollywood effect” and therefore “any
ethical analysis is subject to contestation and lacking
demonstrable ‘facts’.”167 He also outlined “the moral
calculus of oversight and accountability” by compar
ing the evolution of the “kill chain” from World War
II bombings, to Reaper armed drones, and then to
possible AWS operations. He concluded by arguing
that the LAWS debate will need to continue for years
since “ethical assessments of autonomous weapons
are currently as limited as the technological, military
and political assumptions they are based upon.”168 Dr.
Lee noted the potential impact that popular science
fiction may have on perceptions surrounding AWS
ethical issues; what other cultural influences impact
this discourse?
Cultural Views.
Greg Kennedy in a 2013 Parameters article exam
ined some of the cultural views of other countries re
garding war by proxy. He observes that, even though
U.S. drone attacks may have military success, they may
also increase animosity among the population that
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actually can increase attacks on a besieged government
that the United States is attempting to bolster. Even
though much of the resentment may be anti-American,
unfortunately, “feelings of hostility are often visited
on the most immediate structures of authority [of the
local government].”169 More troubling are the broader
implications “regarding the legality, ethicality, and
operational legitimacy of those [U.S.] acts to deter op
ponents.”170 Kennedy concludes that evolution from
limited covert operations to widespread use of armed
drones exacerbates “the apparent gap between stated
core policies and values and the ability to practice tar
geted killings appears to be a starkly hypocritical and
deceitful position internationally.”171
Two additional articles from the same issue of Pa
rameters delve into some of the nuances of Kennedy’s
article. Jacqueline L. Hazelton examined how the use
of drone strikes compare to other tools of the state.
She argues that strikes against assets that are planning
an imminent attack on the U.S. homeland present dif
ferent moral questions than strikes targeting individu
als that may be acting suspiciously. Thus, she posits
that leaders must consider the full political context
when pondering the use of drone strikes, including
“for example, theaters where the United States is at
war, theaters in which it is not, theaters in which the
United States has national or international permission
to strike, theaters in which it does not, and so on.”172
In his article, Alan W. Dowd contends further that the
current context for U.S. decisionmakers should take
into account how “the brewing international backlash
against the drone war reminds us that means and
methods matter as much as ends.”173
An example illustrating Dowd’s observation re
garding the means and methods can be found in
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French author Grégoire Chamayou’s book, Théorie
du drone (Drone Theory) in the chapter titled “Ethos et
psyche” (“Ethos and psyche”). There he mulls over
the unit morale patch used by some U.S. Reaper UAV
operators that depicts an image of the Grim Reaper
holding a bloody scythe under a heading “USAF
MQ-9 Reaper” and a tab with the motto “That Others
May Die.”174 While the message behind the image may
not win favor amongst international audiences, they
may be even more dismayed to find out that the patch
is a lampoon of the U.S. Air Force Pararescue force
which uses a patch of the same design, but with an
angel instead of the Grim Reaper and the motto, “That
Others May Live.”175
The 2014 NATO Allied Command Transformation
report exploring policy guidance for use of autonomy
also addressed ethical issues and recommended trans
parency for policymakers as they consider potential
benefits and concerns related to AWS technology.
However, the scope of their recommendation went be
yond those of LAWS to include the review of “levels of
responsibility for the intended and unintended conse
quences of tasks performed by autonomous systems,”
and it admonishes that considerations “should not
neglect nonlethal tasks performed autonomously.”176
Warfare: Reduction or Proliferation?
If AWS use becomes widespread, how will it affect
the frequency and intensity of conflict and the applica
tion of force? Despite the anticipated improvements in
lethality and precision in future AWS that may better
deter aggression, many argue that the threshold for
use of force may actually be lowered. Thomas Cowan
explored the impact of robots on warfare using the
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Clausewitz model of war—the trinity of primordial
violence (depicted as the people), chance (depicted
as the military), and reason (depicted as the govern
ment)—as the lens for his analysis. He posited that the
use of “robots will significantly increase the potential
for future conflicts” for three primary reasons. First,
there will be fewer people directly involved as they
are replaced by machines; second, friction will be re
duced as the robots do not suffer from human physi
cal or mental frailties; and third, the government may
operate with less constraint since the probability of
creating friendly casualties is reduced.177
In a 2002 Parameters article, D. Keith Shurtleff ex
pounds on the notion of how increasing technology
may diminish warfighters’ humanity. He examines the
concept of disengagement, often facilitated through
video recordings such as “the luckiest man in Iraq”—
a man in a video that drove a truck across a bridge just
before a precision bomb destroyed the bridge. General
Norman Schwarzkopf used this moniker as a punch
line during an Operation DESERT STORM press con
ference as many others have done in a similar manner
since. Shurtleff sums up the dilemma as:
what we must deal with now is how to accept, even
embrace, technologies that make war safer, and yet
somehow counter the trend that such technologies
have to disengage us, to make war more acceptable or
potentially more ubiquitous.178

An interesting phenomenon that runs counter to
Shurtleff’s thesis that robots may reduce our basic
humanity involves situations where soldiers in OEF/
OIF personified “their” robots and wanted them fixed
because of their “loyalty.” This was the case of a badly
damaged EOD PackBot named “Scooby-Doo” as told
in Singer’s Wired for War.179
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In contrast, in his 2013 Parameters article, Dowd
cautions against the possible development of a “Jupi
ter Complex” by national leaders—a condition coined
during World War II to describe “the notion of the
Allies as righteous gods raining retributive thunder
bolts on their wicked enemies.”180 The promises of in
creased combat effectiveness at reduced costs can be
seductive.
UCAVs take the logic of the Jupiter Complex to its
ultimate conclusion—maximum use of economic and
technological resources with zero manpower losses
and zero risks—all buffered by the virtual-reality na
ture of the delivery system.181

How can the U.S. leadership steer clear of such
temptations?
Toward the Future.
A report on AWS under International Law by the
Geneva Academy points to the need for leaders to con
sider the balance between advantages and disadvan
tages of using AWS for a given mission. Possible ad
vantage include “the absence of emotions such as fear,
vengeance, or self-interest [that] may lead to outcomes
that overall are less harmful.” But lack of feelings may
be a disadvantage in certain situations since “autono
mous weapon systems lack positive human emotions,
such as compassion or mercy.”182 Dowd notes further
that “they [UAS] remove the unique characteristics
humans bring to the battlespace: deliberation, doubt,
fear, gut instinct, and judgment.” 183
So then, how should leaders resolve the tension
between these perspectives? Perhaps a good starting
point is a group of questions sent to representatives of
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the 2015 UN LAWS Meeting as “Food-for-thought” to
prepare for the dialogue.
Military rationale for autonomous functions in weapon
systems.
(a) What is the military rationale for pursuing
autonomy in specific functions of weapons systems?
What would be the reasons for limiting the autono
mous capabilities of weapon systems?
(b) In what situations are distinctively human
traits, such as fear, hate, sense of honor and dignity,
compassion, and love, desirable in combat? In what
situations do machines that lack emotions offer dis
tinct advantages over human combatants?
(c) International humanitarian law indicates how a
party to a conflict should behave in relation to people
at its mercy, how would machines comprehend such
situations?
(d) Given the volume and complexity of available
information, what advantages do autonomous pro
cesses offer? Do these make a machine more, or less
reliable than a human decisionmaker?
(e) Are there scenarios in which autonomy might
help to protect the lives of civilians and combatants?
For example, more precise targeting, preventing col
lateral damage and lower response time to attacks?
(f) What are the specific opportunities and concerns
for developing and deploying autonomous weapons
in the context of land, sea, and air operations?184
Sources of recent studies and literature that sup
port thoughtful deliberation of these questions can be
found at the website of the CNAS Ethical Autonomy
Project (this includes an extensive online bibliography
as public education resource).185 With such deliberate
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and continuous examination of the ethical issues in
addition to those of mission effectiveness and legal
ity, we can hopefully escape the fate offered in a final
warning from Dowd: “It would be ironic if the promise
of risk-free war presented by drones spawned a new
era of danger for the United States and its allies.”186
RECOMMENDATIONS
This Paper explores a diverse set of complex issues
related to the developmental, operational, legal, and
ethical aspects of AWS. Many of these issues are al
ready on the agendas of competent government, nongovernment, and industry organizations, with mixed
progress toward full understanding and resolution.
The section offers recommendations to facilitate the
best evolutionary path for the future of some of the
key issues affecting the use of AWS to enhance U.S.
national security.
Policy.
Current DoD policy appears to address the big
issues being raised internationally in such venues as
those sponsored by the UN and the ICRC. The next it
eration of AWS policy in DoD Directive 3000.09 should
expand to include unarmed, unmanned platforms
that are capable of causing damage to individuals or
property if they malfunction or if their command and
control link is lost.
DoD should abandon discrete definitions that pi
geonhole systems into categories of autonomy and
instead consider the recommendations of the DSB
regarding the characterization of autonomy. Accord
ingly, DoD should develop a framework which con
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siders the autonomous functions of a system and how
they may change during the course of a given mission.
Thus, it is more important to clearly identify when
autonomous functioning of the unmanned system is
planned to occur (intentionally autonomous) as well
as how and when it can occur unintentionally (either
through normal malfunction, interference, or attack by
adversary on the system or its links). Existing frame
works to consider include ones proposed by CNAS
(that examines human-machine command and con
trol, complexity of machine, and type of decision)187
and by the DSB (that examines cognitive echelon, mis
sion timelines, and human-machine trade space).188
DoD and the Army need to evaluate the budget for
unmanned ground vehicle development to assess the
realism of its ability to achieve any serious evolution
of capability and integration into the ground forces
writ large. Any such review should attempt to justify
resource allocation based on the operational merits of
UGV systems and not emphasize dubious claims of
cost savings.189
Maintaining Humanity.
DoD policy should continue to require measures
that allow the exercise of human judgment and con
trol in AWS operations. Further, this requirement
should expand to include greater emphasis for com
manders and planners to consider how the scope of
such human control may vary during a given mission
as well as the potential strategic implications of any
fully autonomous mission segments. Also, the AWS
development community should also emphasize how
autonomy and human control may vary during op
erations and design fault-tolerate systems that incor
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porate “fail safe” modes for all mission segments, not
just those designated to be intentionally autonomous.
The development community should also establish
and promulgate an ethical code of conduct for work
on AWS similar in nature to that proposed by Human
Rights Watch and IHRC.
All parties involved with the development and op
eration of AWS need to ensure the human dimension
is explicitly emphasized and monitored in doctrine,
organizations, and processes. Leaders and planners
need to be vigilant to guard against any form of the
“Jupiter Complex” that may emerge at the strategic
level. Developers and operators need to guard against
any unhealthy disengagement at the tactic and opera
tional levels.190
Strategic Implications.
The mainstream discussions regarding military
unmanned systems and AWS are dominated by issues
related to the use of armed drones. Popular media fo
cuses on the exploits of UAVs, from possible package
delivery vehicles to platforms that invade privacy.
Government and commercial investors are pursuing
the development and integration of driverless cars
into the nation’s highway system. Many of these ef
forts involve regulations that cut across government
departments, but there is no clear consideration for
how these efforts are preceding writ large.
The long-term implications for current tactical and
operational use of existing unmanned systems are set
ting de facto rules of engagement and expectations do
mestically and internationally. It is unlikely that any
practical and authoritative strategy and governance
will emerge that can embrace the full scope of current
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autonomous systems, let alone keep pace with future
developments. With this in mind, the onus of consid
ering the broader context and strategic implications is
best practiced by individual stakeholders for the near
future. Responsible stakeholders should act coopera
tively and proactively as frameworks of compliance
and best practices are formulated and formalized in
the coming decades.
Additional Issues to Explore.
The scope of this Paper necessarily excludes many
significant AWS issues, but two merit special attention
for future studies. First, there needs to be serious dia
logue regarding how AWS principles apply to systems
that operate in the domains of space and cyberspace.
Cyberspace systems are explicitly excluded from cur
rent DoD policy on AWS, but these systems not only
facilitate the operation of AWS in other domains, but
they may also act as autonomous software agents in
operations limited to the cyberspace domain. Second,
the use of autonomy and its anticipated proliferation
need to be included in dialogues regarding hybrid
warfare by state and nonstate actors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evolution of autonomous weapon systems
accelerated significantly after the 9/11 attacks on the
U.S. homeland, and they will likely continue to grow
in both capabilities and numbers. This growth of un
manned systems is not limited to the U.S. military or
even the United States; it is an international phenom
ena that includes government and commercial appli
cations in all domains—air, land, and sea. Currently,
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air-based systems dominate all aspects of AWS—bud
get, development, and operations. Unmanned ground
systems receive much lower priority and are largely
relegated to niche applications vice being seriously
considered as part of an integrated future land force.
Commercial endeavors for unmanned systems are at
the forefront of many technologies and their prolifera
tion will likely outnumber military use in the future.
As the U.S. military moves forward with the devel
opment of AWS doctrine that spans the full range of
military operations, it may be well served to charac
terize autonomy not as a discrete property of a given
system, but rather as a function that varies in its stra
tegic, operational, and tactical context and mission
application. When can the system be autonomous?
When is it planned in a given mission to do so? When
can it do so by accident or failure? Efforts that address
such questions should be tempered with the purpose
ful consideration of human judgment and control as
well as legal and ethical standards that foster inter
national credibility. In many of the challenges related
to autonomous weapon systems, the United States is
setting both overt and tacit precedents for the world—
will we be able to live up to them if they are applied
to us?
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